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Introduction	Let	 me	 begin	 with	 an	 admission:	 I	 am	 neither	 a	 Neo-Kantian	 myself	 nor	 a	historian	of	 philosophy.	 I	 became	aware	of	 Cassirer’s	work	 through	my	 search	for	precedents	 for	the	kind	of	structural	realism	that	Ladyman	was	developing,	as	 captured	 in	 the	 slogan	 ‘The	world	 is	 structure’.	 As	 is	 now	well-known,	 this	differs	from	Worrall’s	form	of	structural	realism	in	that	the	latter	maintains	‘All	that	we	know	is	structure’	and	in	his	early	writings,	Worrall	followed	Poincaré	in	his	insistence	that	the	nature	of	the	world,	beyond	this	structure,	was	unknown	to	us.	Subsequently	he	adopted	a	kind	of	agnosticism	with	regard	to	this	‘nature’	but	 in	 that	 earlier	 form	 we	 find	 certain	 Kantian	 resonances,	 which	 is	 not	surprising	 of	 course,	 given	 its	 ancestry	 in	 Poincaré’s	work.	 One	might	 initially	think	 that	 the	 neo-Kantian	 would	 find	 Ladyman’s	 collapse	 of	 ‘nature’	 into	‘structure’	to	be	unfortunate	but,	of	course,	if	one	takes	‘the	world’	of	the	realist	to	 be	 the	 phenomenal	 world,	 with	 the	 noumena	 taken	 negatively	 and	 not	regarded	as	 the	world	of	determinate	but	unknowable	objects,	 in	 the	way	 that	Worrall	conceives	of	it	(and	here	I	recognise	that	I	am	stepping	into	a	minefield!)	then	there	may	not	be	such	a	chasm	between	these	two	views	as	might	at	 first	appear.		 Having	 said	 that,	 and	 as	 I	 emphasised	 in	my	 (2014),	 my	 intention	was	never	 to	present	Ladyman’s	 form	of	 structural	 realism	as	neo-Kantian	 (indeed,	that	 would	 be	 close	 to	 oxymoronic!).	 Instead,	 my	 aim	 was	 two-fold:	 first,	 I	wanted	to	bring	back	in	to	the	light	some	of	the	history	of	structuralist	thought	about	 science	 that	 had	 been	 overshadowed	 by	 Russell’s	 work.	 Typically,	 the	latter’s	 Analysis	 of	 Matter	 has	 been	 cited	 by	 both	 advocates	 and	 critics	 of	structural	 realism	 (particularly	with	 regard	 to	 the	 so-called	Newman	problem,	widely	but	incorrectly	perceived	as	a	major	issue	for	such	a	stance),	with	little	or	no	appreciation	of	the	fact	that	written	as	it	was	in	1926	and	published	in	1927,	it	contains	only	glimpses	of	 the	emerging	theory	of	quantum	mechanics.	 It	was	only	 subsequently	 that	 Eddington	 and,	 of	 course,	 Cassirer	 appreciated	 the	significance	of	 this	new	theory	 for	 the	structuralist	 line	of	 thought,	particularly	with	regard	to	its	impact	on	the	notion	of	object.	Incorporating	this	impact	both	protects	 their	 similar	 but	 crucially	 distinct	 accounts	 from	 the	 afore-mentioned	criticisms	 (thus	 it	 enabled	 Eddington	 to	 sidestep	 the	 Newman	 problem	 in	 his	debate	 with	 Braithwaite)	 and	 allows	 them	 to	 be	 further	 developed	 in	 fruitful	ways	that	advocates	of	modern	forms	of	structural	realism	have	missed.			 Secondly,	 and	more	provocatively,	 I	wanted	 to	present	 that	history	as	 a	set	of	resources	that	the	modern	structuralist	could	appropriate.	In	my	(2014)	I	described	this	–	somewhat	tongue	in	cheek	–		as	a	‘Viking	approach’,	in	the	sense	that	 history	 is	 viewed	 as	 there	 to	 be	 pillaged.	 Under	 the	 influence	 of	 kinder,	gentler	colleagues	I’ve	since	come	to	refer	to	it	as	a	‘toolbox	approach’	(cf.	French	and	Mackenzie	2012),	with	the	idea	being	that	history	can	be	seen	as	offering	a	
toolbox	of	devices,	moves	and	manoeuvres	that	one	can	draw	on	in	the	current	context.	Of	 course,	 that	might	be	seen	as	sailing	rather	 too	close	 to	a	Whiggish	attitude	but	in	that	case	one	can	respond	by	asking	how	else	can	history	be	used	to	teach	us?!		 Certainly	 Cassirer’s	 neo-Kantian	 stance	 towards	 quantum	 physics	 has	 a	number	of	 features	 that	 the	 structural	 realist	might	 find	 attractive.	Two	of	 the	most	 significant	 are,	 first,	 the	 ontological	move	 away	 from	objects	 that	 can	 be	situated	 within	 a	 more	 general	 shift	 from	 substance	 that	 was	 driven	 by	developments	 in	 modern	 physics—a	 shift	 in	 which	 not	 only	 Cassirer	 but	 also	Eddington	 and	 Whitehead	 participated,	 in	 their	 very	 different	 ways.	 There	 is	much	 yet	 to	 be	 said	 about	 this	 shift	 and	how	 it	 shaped	 the	 responses	 of	 these	different	authors	to	the	scientific	developments	of	the	time.	In	Cassirer’s	case,	of	course,	 the	shift	 is	 from	substance	 to	 function,	 in	Eddington’s	 it	 is	 to	 relational	structures	and	in	Whitehead’s,	famously,	it	is	to	process.			 Secondly	 there	 is	 the	 prominent	 role	 given	 to	 high	 level	 physical	‘principles’,	such	as,	crucially,	symmetry	principles	within	his	overall	structuralist	conception.	 Again	 the	 emergence	 of	 such	 principles	 is	 a	 major	 feature	 of	 the	development	of	modern	physics	but	it	is	one	that	few	commentators	noted	until	comparatively	recently.	Cassirer	was	definitely	‘ahead	of	the	game’	in	this	regard	and	it	is	perhaps	in	this	respect	that	his	framework	meshes	so	well	with	the	later	developments	that	crystallised	in	the	Standard	Model.	As	is	well	known,	and	put	bluntly,	he	suggested	that	this	framework	could	be	understood	as	a	kind	of	non-hierarchical	‘Parmenidean	sphere’,	with	such	principles,	laws	and	measurement	outcomes	 all	 intertwined	 and	 mutually	 informing	 one	 another.	 As	 articulated	within	his	 classic	work	Determinism	and	 Indeterminism,	 this	 represents	 a	 clear	neo-Kantian	 view	 of	 quantum	mechanics	 (see	 Cei	 and	 French	 2009).	 One	 can	obviously	imagine	it	more	or	less	straightforwardly	extended	to	cover	quantum	field	theory	and	since	that	underpins	the	Standard	Model	of	modern	physics,	to	the	latter	also.	But	in	a	sense,	it	already	has	been	so	extended;	let	me	explain.		
The	Standard	Model	At	 the	 core	 of	 the	 Standard	 Model	 lie	 certain	 symmetry	 principles.	 The	importance	 of	 these	 in	 modern	 physics	 was	 noted	 above	 and	 has	 been	 well	documented,	not	least	in	passages	such	as	this,	from	Weinberg:		Nature,	 like	 an	 enemy,	 seemed	 intent	 on	 concealing	 from	us	 its	master	plan.	…	At	 the	same	time,	we	did	have	a	valuable	key	to	nature’s	secrets.	The	laws	of	nature	evidently	obeyed	 certain	 principles	 of	 symmetry,	 whose	 consequences	 we	 could	 work	 out	 and	compare	with	observation,	even	without	a	detailed	theory	of	particles	and	forces.	There	were	symmetries	that	dictated	that	certain	distinct	processes	all	go	at	the	same	rate,	and	that	 also	 dictated	 the	 existence	 of	 families	 of	 distinct	 particles	 that	 all	 have	 the	 same	mass.	 Once	 we	 observed	 such	 equalities	 of	 rates	 or	 of	 masses,	 we	 could	 infer	 the	existence	of	a	symmetry,	and	this	we	thought	would	give	us	a	clearer	idea	of	the	further	observations	that	should	be	made,	and	of	the	sort	of	underlying	theories	that	might	or	might	not	be	possible.	It	was	like	having	a	spy	in	the	enemy’s	high	command.	(Weinberg	2011)		Here	 we	 have	 an	 expression	 of	 two	 of	 symmetry’s	 crucial	 roles:	 the	 first	 is	heuristic,	 in	 uncovering	 further	 observations	 and	 new	 theories	 (for	 one	 of	 the	few	explicit	philosophically	 informed	discussions	of	this	heuristic	role,	see	Post	
1971).	 The	 second	 is	metaphysical,	 in	 that	 symmetries	 are	 taken	 to	 dictate	 or	govern	the	rate	of	certain	processes,	for	example,	or	even	the	existence	of	certain	kinds	of	particles.	It	is	this	latter	aspect	that	I	shall	focus	on	here.		 First	 let	 us	 begin	 with	 the	 grounds	 for	 Cassirer’s	 core	 claim	 in	
Determinism	and	Indeterminism,	namely	that	the	appropriate	lesson	to	be	drawn	from	developments	in	quantum	physics	is	not	that	we	should	abandon	a	causal	view	 of	 the	 world,	 but	 rather	 that	 the	 notion	 of	 physical	 object	 must	 be	 cast	aside.	 These	 grounds	 ultimately	 have	 to	 do	 with	 quantum	 statistics—that	 is,	quantum	mechanics	as	applied	to	assemblies	of	particles—at	the	heart	of	which	sits	the	principle	that	quantum	mechanics	is	‘permutation	invariant’;	or,	in	other	words,	 that	 it	does	not	matter	 to	 the	relevant	measurement	outcomes	whether	the	particles	of	the	system	are	exchanged,	or	permuted,	or	not.	As	early	as	1926	Born	 and	 Heisenberg	 noted	 the	 implication	 of	 this,	 to	 the	 effect	 that	 such	particles	could	not	be	regarded	as	individual	objects	and	this	not	only	critically	influenced	Cassirer,	but	became	part	of	the	standard	lore	in	the	metaphysics	of	quantum	mechanics	(see	French	and	Krause	2006).1			 As	a	constraint	 this	Permutation	Symmetry	divides	up	 the	Hilbert	space	into	self-contained	sectors,	each	corresponding	to	a	certain	fundamental	kind	of	particle	and	yielding	a	particular	 form	of	quantum	statistics,	 the	two	most	well	known	 being	 fermions,	which	 obey	 Fermi-Dirac	 statistics	 and	 bosons,	 obeying	Bose-Einstein	 statistics.2	 Thus,	 the	 most	 fundamental	 kinds	 in	 nature	 are	‘dictated’	by,	or	effectively	drop	out	of,	the	action	of	this	particular	symmetry.3		 Secondly,	 the	underlying	framework	of	the	Standard	Model	 is,	of	course,	quantum	 field	 theory,	 so	 the	 second	 set	 of	 symmetries	 that	 needs	 to	 be	considered	 are	 those	 of	 Minkowski	 space-time	 –	 the	 space-time	 of	 Special	Relativity.	 These	 are	 the	 translations,	 rotations	 and	 ‘boosts’	 that	 are	 captured	mathematically	 by	 the	 Poincaré	 group	 and	 as	 Wigner	 famously	 showed,	 this	yields	a	classification	of	all	elementary	particles,	in	terms	of	their	mass	and	spin.	Thus	 these	 fundamental	 properties	 also	 effectively	 drop	 out	 of	 this	 particular	symmetry.		 Finally,	 the	 Standard	 Model	 itself	 is	 fundamentally	 a	 gauge	 theory,	represented	mathematically	 by	 the	 group	 SU(3)	 x	 SU(2)	 x	 U(1)	 via	 which	 the	relevant	 symmetries	 can	 be	 captured	 within	 the	 theory.	 This	 gauge-theoretic	aspect	refers	 to	 the	way	 in	which	the	Lagrangian	of	a	system	–	which	basically	captures	 the	 dynamics	 of	 that	 system	 –	 remains	 invariant	 under	 a	 group	 of	transformations,	 where	 the	 ‘gauge’	 denotes	 certain	 redundant	 degrees	 of	freedom	 of	 that	 Lagrangian.	 The	 generator	 of	 this	 group	 of	 transformations	represents	a	field	and	when	such	a	field	is	quantised,	we	get	the	so-called	gauge	bosons.	 Thus,	 consider	 electrodynamics,	 for	 example:	 here	 the	 relevant	 gauge	symmetry	group	associated	with	the	property	of	charge	is	labelled	U(1)	and	the																																																									1	 As	 it	 turns	 out,	 it	 is	 not	 necessary	 to	 give	 up	 individuality	 in	 this	 context	 and	 hence	 the	motivation	for	current	forms	of	ontic	structural	realism	is	not	this	,loss	of	individuality	but	rather	that	 there	 is	 a	 kind	 of	metaphysical	 underdetermination	 in	 play,	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 the	 physics	cannot	determine	whether	we	should	regard	the	particles	as	individual	objects	or	non-individual	objects.		2	There	are	others,	corresponding	to	so-called	parastatistics.		3	 Thus	 Permutation	 Symmetry	 is	 represented	 mathematically	 by	 the	 permutation	 group,	 of	course.	 It	 remains	 a	 source	 of	 puzzlement	 to	 me	 that	 Cassirer	 does	 not	 mention	 this	 in	
Determinism	and	Indeterminism,	despite	the	fact	that	Weyl,	for	example,	had	emphasised	its	core	role	in	the	foundations	of	the	new	quantum	theory.		
requirement	 of	 gauge	 invariance	 yields	 a	 particular	 gauge	 boson,	 namely	 the	photon.	Thus	 the	photon	effectively	drops	out	of	 the	 imposition	of	 this	 further	symmetry.	This	requirement	can	then	be	extended	to	the	other	forces	in	physics	and	 so,	 for	 the	 weak	 nuclear	 force,	 we	 have	 the	 SU(2)	 symmetry	 group	associated	 with	 isospin,	 a	 property	 of	 protons	 and	 neutrons,	 and	 the	 strong	nuclear	 force	 associated	with	 SU(3)	which	 operates	 on	 the	 colour	 property	 of	quarks.	If	we	add	the	newly	discovered	Higgs	boson	associated	with	the	breaking	of	the	isospin	symmetry	of	the	unified	electro-weak	force	and	responsible	for	the	acquisition	 of	 mass,	 we	 have	 a	 complete	 picture	 of	 the	 fundamental	 forces,	gravity	excepting	of	course.4				 Now	there	has	been	a	great	deal	written	about	the	nature	and	role	of	such	symmetry	principles	in	modern	physics	(see,	for	example,	the	papers	in	Brading	and	 Castellani	 (2003);	 also	 	 Brading	 and	 Castellani	 (2013);	 and	 for	 recent	discussions,		Greaves	and	Wallace	(2014)	and	Friederich		(2015)).	A	particularly	apposite	set	of	considerations—as	far	as	this	essay	is	concerned—can	be	found	in	Caulton	(2015).	Here	he	focuses	on	the	dual	aspect	of	the	role	of	symmetries:	on	 the	 one	 hand	 they	 are	 associated	 with	 certain	 well-known	 physical	consequences.	Consider	the	case	of	‘spin’,	which	cannot	be	accommodated	within	classical	physics	but,	as	noted	above,	 ‘drops	out’	of	 the	Poincaré	symmetry.	On	the	 other	 hand,	 they	 are	 also	 associated	 with	 a	 kind	 of	 representational	redundancy,	 as	 the	 examples	 of	 gauge	 and	 permutation	 symmetry	 illustrate.	Take	the	latter:	in	classical	statistical	mechanics	the	permutation	of	two	particles	between	two	states,	say,	leads	to	a	new	arrangement	that	then	must	be	counted	in	 the	 combinatorial	 analysis	 that	underpins	Maxwell-Boltzmann	 statistics;	 but	in	 quantum	 statistics,	 such	 a	 permutation	 is	 deemed	 not	 to	 lead	 to	 any	 new	arrangement	and	thus	the	relevant	 ‘count’	 is	entirely	different.5	 In	this	domain,	the	permutation	is	nothing	more	than	a	redundant	feature	of	the	representation	and	 the	 constraint	 of	 permutation	 symmetry	 ensures	 that	 it	 is	 removed	 from	effective	consideration.			 Caulton	 captures	 this	 distinction	 between	 those	 symmetries	 that	 have	physical	consequences	and	those	that	rule	out	certain	 features	as	redundant	 in	terms	of	the	labels	‘analytic’	and	‘synthetic’,	drawing	a	comparison	with	analytic	and	synthetic	propositions.	Analytic	symmetries	on	 this	view	do	not	produce	a	different	 physical	 state	 and	 are	 true	 in	 all	 kinematically	 possible	 worlds.	 So,	again,	consider	permutation	symmetry	in	quantum	physics:	as	noted	above,	this	yields	 a	 division	 of	 Hilbert	 space	 into	 distinct	 sectors,	 corresponding	 to	 the	different	particle	 statistics.	Thus	a	particle	within	 the	Bose-Einstein	 sector	will	behave	 as	 a	 boson	 and,	 it	 turns	 out,	 cannot	 escape	 to	 become	 a	 fermion,	 say.	From	the	perspective	of	that	boson,	the	other	sectors	(which	include	not	only	the	Fermi-Dirac	but	also	‘para-statistics’)	are	all	redundant	theoretical	structure.			By	 virtue	 of	 being	 true	 in	 all	 kinematically	 possible	 worlds,	 these	 analytic	symmetries	 act	 as	 fixed	points	 or	 constraints	 in	 any	 interpretation	of	 a	 theory	and	 determine	 the	 form	 of	 the	 representation	 relation	 between	 the	 relevant	states	as	described	mathematically	and	represented	physically,	via	the	partition																																																									4	 For	 structuralist	 accounts	 of	 the	 development	 of	 quantum	 gravity,	 see	 Rickles,	 French	 and	Saatsi	2006.	5	 Thus,	 taking	 this	 case	 of	 two	 particles	 distributed	 over	 two	 states,	 in	 Maxwell-Boltzmann	statistics	we	get	four	possible	arrangements,	but	in	Bose-Einstein	statistics	we	get	only	three	and	in	the	Fermi-Dirac	case,	only	one.		
of	the	relevant	space	(the	obvious	example	here	being	that	of	Hilbert	space	and	permutation	 symmetry	 as	 just	 mentioned).	 The	 resulting	 constraints	 on	 a	theory’s	 representation	 relation	 amount	 to	 a	 precondition	 on	 that	 theory’s	formalism	 having	 empirical	 significance.	 Thus	 such	 symmetries	 cannot	themselves	be	taken	as	empirical	claims	per	se;	rather	they	are	the	‘mediators’	of	the	 relationship	 between	 the	 mathematical	 formalism	 and	 the	 physical	 world	(Caulton	 ibid.).	 In	 this	 regard,	 then,	 they	 serve	 a	 similar	 role	 to	 that	 of	Reichenbach’s	constitutive	a	priori	principles.			 As	 is	 very	well	 known,	 Reichenbach,	 in	 his	 early	 thought,	 distinguished	between	those	synthetic	apriori	principles	that	are	necessary	and	transcendent	and	those	that	are	constitutive	of	our	representations	of	the	world.	The	latter,	of	course,	 are	 revisable.	 Putting	 things	 rather	 crudely,	 their	 constitutive	 role	 is	cashed	out	in	terms	of	underpinning	the	establishment	of	a	form	of	coordination	between	some	aspect	of	experience	and	our	mathematico-scientific	description	of	 it.	 But	 of	 course,	 the	 delineation	 of	 that	 aspect	 arises	 in	 part	 via	 that	coordination	(Reichenbach	1965,	p.	40).	This	resonates	with	a	similar	issue	that	arises	 within	 the	 structuralist	 framework:	 the	 appropriate	 mathematical	description	of	 symmetries	 such	as	permutation	 symmetry	 is	 group	 theory.	But	group	 theory	requires	an	already	available	set	of	elements	on	which	 the	group	transformations	act,	in	a	sense.	How	can	the	structuralist	shift	focus	from	those	elements	to	the	structure	embodied	in	the	symmetry,	or	avoid	reference	to	such	elements	entirely	in	favour	of	this	structure,	when	the	application	of	the	relevant	mathematics	 effectively	 begins	 by	 assuming	 such	 elements?	 This	 becomes	 a	particularly	acute	issue	in	Cassirer’s	case:	how	can	he	push	the	notion	of	object	away	 from	 centre	 stage,	 in	 favour	 of	 his	 Parmenidean	 sphere,	 when	 the	mathematical	description	of	the	crucial	general	principles	seems	to	demand	that	very	notion?	This	was	an	issue	faced	by	Poincaré	and	Weyl	and	Eddington	and	it	crops	up	again	and	again.	One	way	around	it	is	to	adopt	the	response	of	Poincaré	himself	and	effectively	take	these	elements	to	be	no	more	than	heuristic	devices	that	enable	the	construction	of	the	structural	framework	but	which	can	then	be	discarded	or,	at	least,	downplayed	in	ontological	terms	(see	French	2014	p.	66-68).	 Likewise,	 one	 can	 understand	 Reichenbach’s	 coordination	 as	 proceeding	iteratively:	we	begin	with	a	 set	of	 elements	–	quantum	particles	 say	–	 that	 are	initially	 conceived	 of	 as	 objects,	 in	 at	 least	 a	 minimal	 sense	 that	 permits	 the	application	 of	 the	 relevant	 mathematics	 of	 group	 theory.	 Thus	 applying	permutation	 symmetry,	 as	 encapsulated	 in	 the	 permutation	 group,	we	 get	 the	division	between	bosons	and	 fermions	(and	other	kinds	 if	we	are	 interested	 in	parastatistics,	 as	 mentioned	 in	 footnote	 2)	 and	 hence	 the	 relevant	 structure	based	 kind	 distinction.	 But	 from	 this	 perspective,	 that	 distinction	 comes	 to	 be	established	on	the	basis	of	this	Reichenbachian	coordination.			 Synthetic	 symmetries,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 do	 generate	 physical	differences,	 as	 the	 afore-mentioned	 example	 of	 spin	 and	 Poincaré	 symmetry	make	clear.	Caulton	notes	 that	 these	come	 in	 two	kinds	depending	on	whether	we	 limit	 the	quantities	we	want	 preserved	 or	 the	 states	 for	which	we	demand	preservation	 of	 values	 for	 the	 relevant	 physical	 quantities.	 Now,	 as	 science	advances,	 we	 may	 find	 that	 certain	 symmetries	 generate	 no	 observable	differences.	 These	 may	 be	 assimilated	 to	 the	 analytic	 kind,	 in	 two	 ways	depending	on	the	kind	of	synthetic	symmetry	involved.	Thus,	we	may	reduce	the	set	 of	 quantities	 we	 take	 to	 be	 physical,	 thereby	 reducing	 the	 set	 of	 natural	
properties	and	relations	that	according	to	the	theory	can	be	found	in	the	world.	Likewise,	we	may	reduce	the	space	of	mathematical	states	taken	to	represent	a	physical	 state,	 again	 resulting	 in	 a	 reduction	 in	 the	 natural	 properties	 and	relations,	since	the	amount	of	possible	worlds	is	decreased	via	which	these	may	be	distinguished	(ibid.).		 More	 importantly,	 perhaps,	 Caulton	 proposes	 the	 following	 meta-conventional	principle:	maximise	the	analytic	symmetries	of	a	theory,	subject	to	empirical	 adequacy.	 This	 plays	 the	 role	 of	 Reichenbach’s	 regulative	 apriori	principles,	used	to	eliminate	universal	 forces	 in	the	case	of	relativity	theory	for	example.	Hence	he	proposes	a	 two-stage	process	of	 theory	construction:	 in	 the	first	 stage,	 we	 establish	 representational	 connections	 between	 the	 theory	 and	some	 aspect	 of	 the	 physical	 world,	 assuming	 the	 theory	 to	 be	 empirically	adequate.	 In	 the	 second	 stage,	 we	maximise	 the	 theory’s	 analytic	 symmetries,	taking	advantage	of	the	connections	already	established	so	as	not	to	undermine	the	theory’s	empirical	adequacy.	If	we	adopt	the	Reichenbachian	understanding	of	 these	 symmetry	 principles,	 we	 can	 view	 this	 as	 a	 neo-Kantian	 approach	 to	theory	construction.		
Mixing	in	a	Little	Metaphysics	Now,	 we	 shall	 return	 to	 this	 distinction	 between	 analytic	 and	 synthetic	symmetries	 below,	 but	 turning	 our	 attention	 back	 to	 the	 physics,	 one	 might	immediately	question	whether	these	symmetries	are	all	there	is	to	the	Standard	Model—if	this	is	a	model	of	elementary	particle	physics,	where	do	the	particles	fit	into	the	above	schema?	Or,	to	put	it	another	way,	how	do	the	particles	relate	to	the	symmetries	set	out	above?	Here	Cassirer	has	already	suggested	an	answer,	when	he	 insists	 that	we	can	 talk	about	electrons,	 for	example,	 ‘only	 indirectly’,	‘...not	insofar	as	they	themselves,	as	individuals,	are	given,	but	so	far	as	they	are	describable	as	“points	of	intersection”	of	certain	relations’		(1936,	p.	179;	as	cited	in	French	and	Ladyman	2003,	which	extends	 ‘ontic	structural	realism’	 to	QFT).	But	 this	 invites	 the	 further	 question:	metaphysically	 speaking,	 how	 should	 we	conceive	of	the	electrons,	qua	‘points	of	intersection—as	derivative	entities	or	as	eliminated	 entirely?	 Adopting	 the	 first	 option	 amounts	 to	 a	 form	 of	 what	 has	been	called	‘moderate’	structural	realism,	while	the	second	yields	the	‘radical’	or	‘eliminativist’	form.			 As	 for	 the	 metaphysical	 relationship	 between	 the	 relevant	 symmetries	and	 the	 particles—described	 above	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 properties	 of	 the	 latter	‘dropping	out	of’	or	being	‘dictated	by’	the	former—	how	is	this	to	be	captured?	One	 option	might	 be	 via	 some	 form	 of	 dependence	 relation,	 in	 the	 sense	 that	these	properties	are	understood	to	be	dependent	upon	the	relevant	symmetries.	Now,	 insofar	 as	 these	 properties	 are	 described	 by	means	 of	 the	mathematical	representation	associated	with	 the	relevant	group,	McKenzie	has	argued	(2013	and	2017;	 see	also	Wolff	2012)	 that	 the	nature	of	 that	 relation	 is	 that	of	 inter-
dependence,	 formally	 between	 the	 relevant	 group	 and	 that	 associated	representation	 which	 captures	 the	 particle	 properties,	 so	 adopting	 this	metaphysical	device	is	tantamount	to	adopting	the	moderate	form	of	structural	realism.			 Alternatively,	 if	 one	has	 eliminativist	 sympathies,	 one	might	 conceive	of	the	 symmetries	 (and	 the	 associated	 laws)	 as	 determinables	 and	 the	 relevant	properties	 as	determinates,	 just	 as	 one	 conceives	 of	 red	 and	 shades	 or	 hues	 of	
that	colour	(French	2014	pp.	280-281).	In	this	case	there	is	no	dependence	but	rather	 the	 relevant	 property	 is	 regarded	 as	 a	more	 determinate	 feature	 of	 the	symmetry	qua	determinable,	just	as	crimson	is	a	more	determinate	form	of	red.	This	 captures	 the	 inherent	 modal	 character	 of	 these	 symmetries,	 in	 that	 they	contain	 more	 possibilities	 than	 are	 actually	 realized—as	 noted	 above	 (fn	 2),	Permutation	 Symmetry	 offers	 more	 possibilities	 than	 the	 Bose-Einstein	 and	Fermi-Dirac	kinds	that	we	observe	in	the	actual	world.	These	determinate	kinds,	any	further	properties	that	‘drop	out’	of	the	relevant	symmetry	group	(suc	as	the	Poincaré	 group	 for	 example)	 and	 also	 the	 concrete	 measurement	 results	pertaining	 to	 these	 properties,	 can	 then	 be	 regarded	 as	 ‘existential	 witnesses’	(Wilson	2012)	to	the	nature	of	the	structure	as	a	whole,	via	which	it	is	effectively	made	 actual.	 Using	 Cassirer’s	work	 as	 a	 toolbox,	 one	 can	 then	 conceive	 of	 the	structure	of	the	world	from	this	perspective	as	an	interlocking	Parmenidean-like	sphere	 of	 symmetries,	 laws,	 the	 properties	 they	 dictate	 and	 hence	 the	measurement	 outcomes	 they	 yield,	 differentiated	 internally,	 as	 it	 were,	 by	 the	determinable-determinate	relationship	as	sketched	here	(French	2014	pp.	94).		
A	Cassirerean	Framework	for	the	Standard	Model	My	contention,	then,	is	that	the	core	ingredients	of	a	neo-Kantian	approach	to	the	Standard	 Model	 can	 already	 be	 found	 in	 Determinism	 and	 Indeterminism,	regarded	 as	 a	 historical	 toolbox	 as	 indicated	 above.	 Moving	 in	 the	 opposite	direction	 to	 that	 of	 the	 above	 sketch,	 that	 is,	 from	 statements	 of	 the	 results	 of	measurements	to	statements	of	laws	and	then	to	statements	of	the	higher	order	principles,	 the	 moves	 involved	 represent	 ‘decisive	 transformation[s]’	 (1936	 p.	31).	Thus,	 in	 the	 first	case	we	have	a	move	 from	 immediate	perceptual	data	 to	experimental	 observation,	 where	 the	 latter	 must	 be	 understood	 as	 a	determination	into	which	concepts	of	measure	and	number	enter	(what	follows	is	taken	from	Cei	and	French	2009).	From	statements	of	measurement	results	to	those	of	 laws	we	shift	 from	the	 ‘space-time	realm’	 in	which	individual	 facts	are	situated	and	thus	from	the	‘here-now’	to	the	‘if-then’,	or	as	I	would	say,	from	the	determinate	to	the	determinable.	It	is	the	laws	that	bring	the	particular	into	the	whole	via	the	notion	of	function	and	as	noted	in	Cei	and	French	(2009)	there	is	a	significant	similarity	between	Cassirer’s	discussion	of	 the	 form	of	 laws	and	 the	kind	 of	 consideration	 that	 has	 motivated	 more	 recent	 forms	 of	 structuralism.	Thus,	he	notes	that	once	placed	in	this	form,	phenomena	come	to	be	established	as	‘enduring	thoughts’	(op.	cit..,	p.	38),	giving	as	an	example,	Fourier’s	theory	of	heat	 which	 transcended	 the	 view	 of	 heat	 as	 a	 fluid	 via	 its	 mathematical	description	in	terms	of	which	the	phenomena	were	represented	as	the	results	of	‘purely	geometrical	relations’.	It	is	this	separation	of	the	fundamental	structure,	as	represented	by	 the	mathematical	equations,	 from	the	underlying	ontological	commitments	that	was	also	noted	by	Poincaré	and	which	motivated	the	likes	of	Worrall	in	his	version	of	structural	realism.		As	 Cassirer	 goes	 on	 to	 note,	 the	 endurance	 of	 this	 particular	 thought	 is	further	manifested	in	the	deployment	of	Fourier’s	formulae	by	Heisenberg	in	his	development	of	quantum	mechanics,	giving	a	nice	example	of	what	Cassirer	calls	the	 ‘indwelling	 sagacity’	 (Spürkraft)	 of	 such	 forms.	 Here	 we	 see	 another	commonality	 with	 more	 recent	 structuralist	 developments,	 as	 Saunders	 also	notes	 this	 feature	 (1993),	 referring	 to	 it	 as	 the	 ‘heuristic	 plasticity’	 of	 the	equations	 as	 described	mathematically	 and	 arguing	 that	 it	 is	 by	means	 of	 this	
plastic	 mathematics	 that	 fundamental	 structural	 aspects	 of	 classical	 dynamics	are	 isolated,	 become	 entrenched	 and	 are	 thereby	 preserved	 in	 subsequent	developments.	 In	 particular,	 as	 Saunders	 notes,	 the	 group-theoretic	 features	touched	on	above	 in	particular	provide	 ‘…	over-arching	abstract	 frameworks	…	within	 which	 one	 dynamical	 structure	may	 be	 embedded	 in	 another’	 (ibid.,	 p.	308),	a	comment	with	which	Cassirer	would	surely	agree.	From	laws	to	statements	of	principle,	or	statements	of	third	order,	there	is	 a	 further	 shift	 to	 a	 ‘new	dimension’,	 involving	what	 Cassirer	 refers	 to	 as	 an	‘iridescent	 indeterminateness’	 (ibid.,	 p.	 51),	 or	 loss	 of	 subject	 of	 the	 principle,	that	allows	them	to	function	heuristically	in	the	search	for	new	laws.	Unlike	the	latter,	 the	principles	do	not	 refer	directly	 to	phenomena,	but	 to	 ‘…	 the	 form	of	laws	 according	 to	 which	 we	 order	 these	 phenomena.’	 (ibid.).	 Such	 statements	include	 those	 referring	 to	 symmetries,	 as	well	 as	 causality	 of	 course.	 Crucially,	they	 manifest	 a	 ‘capacity	 for	 “synopsis”’	 (ibid.),	 which	 affords	 an	 overview	 of	more	than	one	physical	domain,	as	manifested	through	their	heuristic	power.		These	statements	of	measurement	outcomes,	laws	and	general	principles	mutually	condition	and	support	one	another	(ibid.,	p.	35)	in	a	kind	of	‘reciprocal	interweaving	 and	 bonding’	 (ibid.)	 that	 yields	 a	 ‘…	 functional	 coordination	 in	which	 all	 the	 elements,	 all	 the	determining	 factors	 of	 physical	 truth,	 uniformly	participate’	(ibid.).	Critically	–		and	again	this	excites	the	modern	day	structuralist	–	Cassirer	rejects	any	‘substantial	carrier’	within	such	a	structure	and	insists	that	‘…	we	do	not	 need	 to	 posit	 objects	 as	 sundered	 beings-in-themselves	 behind	 these	determinations’	(ibid.).	Here	we	see	the	further,	more	general,	shift	from	objects	to	relations	as	the	ground	of	objectivity	in	science;	or	as	Cassirer	put	it,	'[w]e	are	concerned	not	so	much	with	the	existence	of	things	as	with	the	objective	validity	of	relations;	and	all	our	knowledge	of	atoms	can	be	led	back	to,	and	depends	on,	this	 validity'	 (Cassirer	 1936,	 p.	 143).	 And	 in	 the	 quantum	 context,	 taking	 the	'conditions	 of	 accessibility'	 to	 be	 the	 'conditions	 of	 the	 objects	 of	 experience',	then	 '...	 there	 will	 no	 longer	 exist	 an	 empirical	 object	 that	 in	 principle	 can	 be	designated	as	utterly	inaccessible;	and	there	may	be	classes	of	presumed	objects	which	we	will	have	to	exclude	from	the	domain	of	empirical	existence	because	it	is	 shown	 that	 with	 the	 empirical	 and	 theoretical	 means	 of	 knowledge	 at	 our	disposal,	they	are	not	accessible	or	determinable'	(ibid.,	p.	179).	Thus,	there	are	no	epistemically	inaccessible	objects	laying	behind	the	structures	which	we	can	know;	there	is	only	the	structure.	Of	 course,	 Cassirer	 was	 no	 realist,	 in	 the	 current	 sense	 and	 his	 neo-Kantianism	 is	 manifested,	 as	 is	 well	 known,	 in	 his	 rejection	 of	 the	 distinction	between	 pure	 intuition	 and	 the	 understanding,	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 the	 pure	intuition	of	space	and	time	presents	a	kind	of	theatre	in	which	the	pure	logic	of	understanding	encounters	the	manifold	of	perception.	Instead	it	is	the	notion	of	functional	coordination	 that	plays	 the	relevant	role,	 in	 that	 “[these]	same	basic	syntheses	 upon	 which	 mathematics	 and	 logic	 rest,	 also	 govern	 the	 scientific	structure	of	empirical	knowledge	and	first	enable	us,	by	a	fixed	lawful	ordering	of	phenomena	to	speak	of	its	objective	significance”	(Cassirer	1907,	p	45;	quoted	in	 English	 in	 Ryckman	 1991,	 p.	 65).	 Crucially	 for	 Cassirer,	 this	 established	science	 and	 mathematics	 as	 having	 a	 common	 root	 in	 constructing	 the	 ideal	concepts	that	order	experience;	in	effect,	mathematical	and	physical	concepts	are	of	the	same	kind.		
Here	 we	 might	 note	 three	 points,	 the	 first	 two	 of	 which	 relate	 to	 a	structuralist	 ‘agenda’:	 first,	as	already	noted,	 this	 framework	captures	the	roles	of	 symmetry	 principles	 within	 modern	 science,	 where	 this	 includes	 not	 only	their	heuristic	role	but	also	the	distinction	suggested	by	Caulton	above.	Thus,	the	constitutive	 role	 of	what	 Caulton	 calls	 ‘analytic’	 symmetries	 is	 nicely	 captured	here;	 consider,	 yet	 again,	 Permutation	 Symmetry.	 Although	 Cassirer,	 as	 I	mentioned	 above,	 does	 not	 mention	 it	 explicitly	 in	 Determinism	 and	
Indeterminism,	 it	 is	 this	 that	 underpins	 the	 quantum	 statistics	 that	 he	 draws	upon	 to	 reject	 quantum	entities	 as	 substantive	 ‘objects’.	 In	 effect,	what	we	 see	here	 from	 the	neo-Kantian	perspective	 is	 the	 identification	 of	 representational	redundancy	which	through	the	constitutive	nature	of	this	symmetry	leads	to	the	elimination	of	these	objects	in	favour	of	a	structural	based	objectivity.	Secondly,	this	 common	 root	 further	 underpins	 the	 comparison	 between	 electrons	 and	geometrical	points	touched	on	above.	Of	course,	the	structural	realist	might	want	to	 resist	 any	 reduction	 of	 the	 physical	 to	 the	 mathematical	 that	 might	 be	associated	 with	 such	 a	 commonality	 (see	 French	 2014	 Ch.	 8).	 But	 for	 the	structural	 idealist,	 the	establishment	of	such	a	common	root	obviously	yields	a	certain	economy	within	the	overall	framework.		Thirdly,	and	finally,	this	commonality	between	mathematical	and	physical	concepts	 captures	 the	 role	of	mathematics	 in	 science	more	generally.	 Consider	the	Standard	Model	again	and	one	of	its	early	successes:	the	prediction	of	the	Ω-	particle.	Very	briefly,	the	history	is	as	follows:	the	mathematical	representation	of	the	SU(3)	symmetry	in	terms	of	group	theory	yielded	a	certain	representation	one	node	of	which	could	not	be	 identified	with	any	 then	known	particle.	Given	the	 physical	 interpretation	 of	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 framework	 and	 the	 known	properties	 of	 the	 particles	 occupying	 the	 other	 nodes,	 physicists	 were	 able	 to	predict	the	properties	of	this	unknown	particle,	leading	to	its	discovery.	Now,	the	moves	 involved	 in	 this	prediction	have	been	presented	as	raising	 the	 following	question:	how	is	it	that	we	can	successfully	reify	mathematical	structure	in	this	way?	 (see	 for	example,	Bangu	2008).	To	 some,	 this	will	 seem	 to	be	part	of	 the	overall	 mystery	 of	 how	 highly	 abstract	 mathematics	 comes	 to	 be	 applied	 to	concrete	physical	phenomena.	The	realist	has	one	way	of	dissipating	any	sense	of	mystery	by	urging	a	focus	on	the	physical	reasons	underpinning	the	deployment	of	 such	 mathematics	 (see	 Bueno	 and	 French	 2018).	 The	 neo-Kantian	structuralist	 can	 offer	 an	 alternative	 account,	 building	 on	Cassirer’s	work:	 it	 is	through	 the	 conceptual	 activity	 of	 the	mind	 that	we	 obtain	 both	mathematical	concepts	(such	as	those	of	group	theory)	and	certain	physical	concepts	(such	as	the	 associated	 symmetries).	 The	 successful	 prediction	 of	 the	 Ω-	 can	 then	 be	understood	as	the	result	of	the	above	functional	coordination	of	principles,	laws	and	 measurements	 in	 which	 all	 three	 uniformly	 participate	 as	 determining	factors	of	the	physical	truth.		In	the	rest	of	this	paper,	I	will	consider	two	concerns:	first,	minor,	that	the	structural	realist	cannot	or	should	not	appropriate	Cassirer’s	 framework	 in	 the	manner	suggested	above;	and	second,	major,	that	the	downgrading	of	the	role	of	intuition	 inherent	 to	his	neo-kantian	vision	raises	obstacles	 to	 the	extension	of	this	vision	to	modern	physics.		
Realist	Appropriation	
With	regard	to	the	first,	Mormann	has	objected	to	the	appropriation	of	Cassirer’s	views	by	modern	day	structural	realists,	claiming	that	‘…	the	structuralists	of	the	21st	 century	 try	 hard	 to	 play	 down	 the	 genuinely	 Neo-	 Kantian	 ingredients	 in	Cassirer’s	 thought	 that	 lead	 him	 to	 a	 structural	 interpretation	 of	 the	 new	physics.’	(Mormann	preprint,	p.	29).		He	goes	on	to	argue	that	the	appropriation	of	 Cassirer’s	 philosophy	 for	 structural	 realism	 ‘…is	 at	 variance	 with	 Cassirer’s	own	interpretation	of	DI	[Determinism	and	Indeterminism],	according	to	which	DI	was	a	continuation	and	clarification	of	 the	account	of	 scientific	knowledge	 that	he	had	 formulated	 for	classical	physics	some	25	years	ago	 in	SF	 ’	 (ibid.,	p.	34).	And	he	concludes	that	‘…	Cassirer’s	idealist	structuralism	may	have	affinities	not	so	 much	 with	 some	 version	 of	 [structural	 realism],	 but	 rather	 with	 another	species	of	structuralism,	namely,	the	one	which	van	Fraassen	has	characterized	as	„empiricist	structuralism“	(ES)	’	(ibid.,	p.	31).			 The	central	basis	for	this	conclusion	lies	with	the	accusation	that	Cei	and	French	 (and	 before	 them,	 French	 and	 Ladyman	 2003),	 ignore	 the	 role	 of	measurement	outcomes	in	their	appropriation.	Now,	as	should	be	obvious,	that	may	 be	 so	 for	 reasons	 having	 to	 do	with	 the	 specific	 aims	 of	 those	 particular	papers	 but	 in	 subsequent	 work	 that	 role	 has	 been	 considered,	 as	 the	 above	summary	 should	 make	 clear	 (see	 again	 French	 2014).	 Indeed,	 insofar	 as	 the	structure	presented	by	the	relevant	laws	and	symmetries	is	inherently	modal	in	encapsulating	 more	 possibilities	 than	 are	 empirically	 observed,	 such	measurement	outcomes	help	underpin	the	crucial	role	of	 ‘existential	witnesses’	as	 noted	 above.	 Crudely,	 it	 is	 via	 such	 measurements	 that	 we	 establish	 that	certain	properties	allowed	by	the	relevant	symmetry	are	not	in	fact	actualised.		 More	 importantly,	 it	 is	 through	 consideration	 of	 the	 role	 of	 the	measurement	 outcomes	 that	 Mormann	 relates	 Cassirer’s	 framework	 to	 van	Fraassen’s	‘empiricist	structuralism’,	which,	as	is	well-known,	is	grounded	in	the	epistemic	 priority	 of	 measurement	 results	 and	 associated	 empirical	 sub-structures.	 However,	 leaving	 to	 one	 side	 the	 crucial	 point	 that	 Cassirer	would	have	had	no	truck	with	giving	measurement	results	such	priority,	given	his	view	of	the	mutual	conditioning	of	measurement,	laws	and	general	principles,	the	role	he	does	assign	to	such	results	is	compatible	with	the	elimination	of	objects	that	the	 ‘radical’	 form	of	 structural	 realism	 advocates.	 The	 reason	 is	 obvious:	what	measurement	gives	us	is	not	the	object	but	only	some	determinate	quantity.		It	is	then	a	further	metaphysical	step	to	insist	that	such	a	quantity	must	‘inhere’	in	a	substance	 or	 be	 bound	 together	 with	 other	 such	 quantities	 into	 a	 bundle	constituting	an	object	and	of	course	those	are	steps	that	Cassirer	would	not	take	either.			 But	 there	 is	 actually	 a	 broader	 and	 even	 more	 important	 point	 here,	which	 is	 that	 the	 name	 of	 the	 game	 is	 not	 to	 show	 the	 affinities	 between	Cassirer’s	 neo-Kantian	 view	 and	 either	 ontic	 structural	 realism	 or	 empiricist	structuralism—or	at	least	not	beyond	the	claim	that	all	can	be	situated	within	a	history	 of	 structuralist	 tendencies—but	 rather	 to	 simply	 appropriate	 certain	moves	and	devices	used	by	Cassirer	for	other	aims.	As	I	have	noted	above,	there	is	 the	obvious	 concern	 that	one	 cannot	 simply	 strip	away	 such	 resources	 from	their	relevant	context.	Strictly	this	is	correct:	if	one	understands	that	resource	in	the	terms	in	which	it	is	originally	presented,	then	those	terms	are	such	that	they	will	 indeed	be	bound	to	that	original	context.	But	again	 if	context	can	never	be	peeled	away,	then	what	use	will	history	be	to	us?	Any	device	or	claim	becomes	so	
context-bound	 it	can	serve	as	 little	more	 than	a	historical	curiosity.	However,	 I	would	argue	that	there	is	a	sense	in	which	we	can	pull	such	resources	out	of	the	relevant	context	and	that	even	if	by	doing	so	we	re-shape	them	in	some	way,	yet	they	may	be	sufficiently	similar	as	 to	be	seen	as	sufficiently	closely	related	but	not	so	much	that	we	must	drag	the	associated	interconnected	meanings	when	we	deploy	 them.	 Thus,	 ‘…	 	 we	 can	 take	 Cassirer’s	 claims	 about	 the	 relative	fundamentality	of	 laws	as	compared	to	objects,	and	the	shift	 in	objectivity,	and	relate	them	to	the	debate	over	the	metaphysical	elaboration	of	structural	realism	without	 having	 to	 bring	 with	 them	 the	 associated	 claims	 about	 the	 ultimate	grounding	of	such	laws	in	mathematics,	or	the	way	that	objectivity	is	constituted	rather	than	given.’	(French	2014,	p.	100).		 	
Capturing	the	Expansion	in	Possibilities	The	 second	 concern	 is,	 however,	 both	 more	 important	 and	 more	 subtle.	Friedman	 has	 argued	 persuasively	 that	 the	 neo-Kantian	 downplaying	 of	 the	faculty	of	pure	intuition/sensibility	in	favour	of	pure	understanding	implies	that	it	 is	 not	 in	 fact	 the	 case	 that	 developments	 in	 modern	 physics	 can	 be	accommodated	 ‘without	 difficulty’.	 This	 of	 course	 goes	 to	 the	 heart	 of	 the	suggestion	articulated	here,	that	Cassirer’s	framework	can	be	extended	to	cover	the	Standard	Model.	At	 its	core,	Friedman’s	problem	is	one	 that	has	 to	do	with	the	 heuristics	 of	 theory	 change:	 how	 can	 the	 fundamental	 mathematical	 and	physical	concepts	of	a	given	theory	give	rise	to—	and	be	replaced	by—those	of	its	successor,	given	that	by	virtue	of	the	context	of	the	former	such	concepts	are	not	 inter-translatable	 with	 those	 of	 the	 latter?	 As	 a	 result	 of	 this	 lack	 of	translatability,	from	the	perspective	of	the	context	in	which	the	original	theory	is	embedded,	the	putative	successor	is	not	even	conceivable.	Thinking	specifically	of	 the	example	of	General	Relativity,	Friedman	claims	 that	 it	 is	not	 just	 that	 ‘…	Einstein’s	 theory	 is	 not	 even	mathematically	 possible	 from	 the	 point	 of	 view	 of	
Newton’s	 original	 theory’	 but	 that	 it	 has	 to	 be	 shown	 that	 ‘…	 Einstein’s	 new	theory	is	empirically	or	physically	possible	as	well’.		 Let	 us	 consider	 this	 example	 in	 a	 little	 more	 detail.	 General	 Relativity	incorporates	two	features	that	distinguish	it	from	Newton’s	theory	of	gravity:	the	equivalance	 of	 inertial	 mass	 and	 gravitational	 mass	 (which	 Newton	 had	 kept	distinct,	 grounding	 that	 distinction	 metaphysically)	 and	 the	 representation	 of	space-time	 in	 terms	 of	 non-Euclidean	 geometry.	 Thus	 the	 theory	 required	 a	genuine	 expansion	 of	 the	 space	 of	 intellectual	 possibilities	 (both	mathematical	and	 empirical).	 The	 problem	 then	 becomes	 one	 of	 explaining	 how	 such	 an	expansion	 is	 possible—since	 before	 the	 expansion	 in	 question,	 from	 the	Newtonian	 perspective,	 the	 new	 theory	 is	 not	 even	 physically	 possible	 (in	Kantian	terms,	it	is	neither	logically	nor	really	possible).	According	to	Friedman,	that	intellectual	space	opened	up	with	Einstein’s	formulation	of	the	Principle	of	Equivalence	 which	 asserts	 the	 equivalence	 of	 gravitational	 mass	 and	 inertial	mass.	Together	with	the	Riemannian	manifolds	on	non-Euclidean	geometry,	this	then	acted	as	part	of	a	constitutively	a	priori	framework	for	the	new	theory.			 But	how	was	this	expansion	achieved?		What	was	needed	was	‘…	a	set	of	parallel	developments	 in	contemporaneous	scientific	philosophy	to	tie	together	the	 relevant	 innovations	 in	 mathematics	 and	 physics	 and	 thereby	 effect	 the	necessary	expansion	in	our	physical	or	empirical	possibilities’	(Friedman	2008,	p.	250).	Einstein	was	only	able	to	do	this	by	‘…	delicately	situating	himself	within	
the	 earlier	 philosophical	 debate	 on	 the	 empirical	 and	 conceptual	 foundations	 of	
geometry	 between	Helmholtz	 and	 Poincaré.	 (ibid.)	 In	 other	words,	 Einstein	 not	only	 appreciated	 the	 heuristic	 force	 of	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 ‘footprint’	 of	 the	Principle	of	Equivalence	within	Newton’s	theory	(see,	again,	Post	op.	cit.)	which	motivated	 his	 famous	 thought	 experiment,	 and	 was	 effectively	 handed	 the	relevant	 mathematical	 tools	 by	 his	 friend	 Grossman,	 but	 he	 was	 also	appropriately	 situated	 philosophically	 in	 the	 context	 of	 previous	 debates	regarding	the	foundations	of	geometry.6		 Given	 this,	 Friedman	 argues	 that	 what	 was	 needed	 was	 a	 more	 far-reaching	 revision	 of	 Kantian	 transcendental	 philosophy	 than	 Cassirer	 had	suggested,	in	the	sense	of	one	that	allows	for	such	an	expansion	in	the	space	of	possibilities.	Friedman	draws	on	Kuhn’s	philosophy	of	science	here,	arguing	that	it	 is	 the	 incommensurability	 of	 certain	 theoretical	 terms	 in	 Newtonian	 and	relativistic	 mechanics	 that	 blocks	 the	 accommodation	 of	 General	 Relativity	within	 Cassirer’s	 framework.	 As	 a	 result,	 he	 suggests,	 what	 is	 needed	 is	 a	relativization	 of	 the	 Kantian	 apriori	 to	 a	 given	 scientific	 theory	 in	 a	 given	
historical	 context	 (or	paradigm,	 if	we	 remain	within	Kuhn’s	 framework),	which	amounts	to	historicizing	the	very	notion	of	transcendental	philosophy	itself.	It	is	for	 this	 reason	 that	 General	 Relativity	 cannot	 be	 incorporated	 within	transcendental	philosophy	 “without	difficulty,”	 since	 the	 latter,	 at	 least	as	Kant	originally	proposed	it,	is	unavoidably	committed	to	the	a	priori	necessary	validity	of	 both	 Euclidean	 geometry	 and	 the	 fundamental	 principles	 of	 Newtonian	mechanics.	(op.	cit.,	pp.	250-251).	As	Friedman	puts	it:				‘…	whereas	Euclidean	geometry	and	the	Newtonian	laws	of	motion	were	indeed	necessary	 presuppositions	 for	 the	 empirical	 meaning	 and	 application	 of	 the	Newtonian	 theory	 of	 universal	 gravitation	 (and	 they	 were	 therefore	constitutively	 a	 priori	 in	 this	 context),	 the	 radically	 new	 mathematical	 and	physical	 framework	 consisting	 of	 the	 Riemannian	 theory	 of	manifolds	 and	 the	principle	 of	 equivalence	 defines	 an	 analogous	 system	 of	 necessary	presuppositions	 in	 general	 relativity.	 Moreover,	 what	 makes	 the	 latter	framework	 constitutively	 a	 priori	 in	 this	 new	 context	 is	 precisely	 the	circumstance	that	Einstein	was	only	able	to	arrive	at	it	in	the	first	place	by	self-consciously	situating	himself	within	the	earlier	tradition	of	scientific	philosophy	represented	(especially)	by	Helmholtz	and	Poincaré…’	(ibid.,	p.	251)			 Recall	 what	 I	 just	 said	 (following	 Post	 op.	 cit.)	 that	 in	 the	 Newtonian	framework	 the	 equivalence	 of	 inertial	 and	 gravitational	 mass	 is	 a	 kind	 of	heuristically	 loaded	 footprint	 of	 Einstein’s	 Principle	 of	 Equivalence:	 as	 far	 as	Friedman	 is	 concerned,	 the	 force	 of	 this	 ‘footprint’	 takes	 us	 from	what	 was	 a	contingent	 fact	 to	what	was,	 for	Einstein,	a	constitutive	principle.7	How,	within	the	neo-Kantian	framework,	can	such	a	shift	take	place?	It	is	not	just	a	matter	of																																																									6	Einstein	was	not	of	course	uniquely	situated	in	this	respect	since	as	is	well-known	Hilbert	also	developed	 the	 field	 equations	 of	 General	 Relativity.	 Whether	 similar	 factors	 enter	 into	 this	expansion	 of	 the	 space	 of	 possibilities	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 Hilbert’s	 situation	 is	 a	 further	interesting	question.		7	Post	(1971)	referred	to	it	as	a	‘footprint’	of	the	new	theory	in	the	old	and	it	would	be	interesting	to	 consider	 how	 many	 such	 footprints	 in	 the	 history	 of	 science	 are	 indicative	 of	 such	 a	transformation	from	contingency	to	constitutive.	
tying	 the	 apriori	 to	 a	 particular	 theory	 but,	 according	 to	 Friedman	 and	 as	 just	noted,	that	of	relativising	it	to	a	particular	context	in	which	Einstein,	in	this	case,	was	situated.		 We	can	perhaps	see	what	is	in	play	here	by	considering	one	of	our	central	symmetry	 principles	 discussed	 above,	 namely	 Permutation	 Symmetry,	 which	falls	 on	 the	 side	 of	 the	 constitutively	 a	 priori	 in	 Caulton’s	 division.	 With	 its	articulation	by	Weyl	and	Wigner	in	particular,	 it	can	be	considered	one	of	 	 	 the	“system	 of	 necessary	 presuppositions”	 of	 quantum	mechanics,	 forming	 part	 of	the	 constitutively	 a	 priori	 framework,	 together	with	 Hilbert	 space.8	 One	 could	perhaps	draw	an	analogy	with	the	Principle	of	Equivalence	above	and	see	in	the	history	of	the	emergence	of	such	symmetries	in	physics	a	shift	from	a	contingent	fact	(relating	to	the	statistical	behaviour	of	an	assembly	of	quantum	entities)	to	a	constitutive	principle	(see	Bueno	and	French	2018).			 But	then	it	 is	in	this	history	that	we	can	find	the	response	to	Friedman’s	problem	 of	 how	 the	 space	 of	 possibilities	 comes	 to	 be	 expanded.	 First	 of	 all,	claims	of	 incommensurability	between	 theories	have	been	widely	attacked	and	dismissed	in	recent	years	and	Kuhn’s	framework	has	crumbled	under	sustained	criticism.9	 Secondly,	 but	 relatedly,	 if	 we	 look	 at	 the	 beginnings	 and	 ends	 of	theoretical	developments,	we	may	well	wonder	how	on	earth	scientists	got	from	‘there’	to	‘here’	and	imagine	that	some	precise	set	of	circumstances	had	to	be	in	place	 to	effect	 the	 transition.	 So,	we	begin	with	Newtonian	mechanics	 and	end	with	General	Relativity	 and	we	 seem	 to	have	 such	 a	blatant	disparity	between	the	two	that	we	are	forced	to	ask	how	it	was	that	something	that	was	not	even	a	mathematical	 possibility	 from	 the	 Newtonian	 point	 of	 view,	 comes	 to	 be	 a	physical	 actuality?	But	 if	we	 track	 the	 individual	moves	made	and	 the	 changes	effected	 through	 the	process,	 as	Einstein	 elevated	 the	 empirical	 equivalence	of	inertial	and	gravitational	mass	into	a	principle	and	appropriated	non-Euclidean	geometry	 as	 a	 tool	 by	which	 he	 could	mathematically	 express	 his	 new	 theory,	then	 we	 an	 begin	 to	 see	 how	 this	 expansion	 takes	 place,	 piecemeal	 fashion.	Likewise,	we	 can	 follow	 the	moves	made	 by	Weyl,	Wigner,	 von	Neumann	 and	others	 in	 the	 application	 of	 group	 theory	 to	 quantum	 mechanics	 and	 the	concomitant	elevation	of	certain	expressions	of	symmetry	(such	as	permutation	symmetry	but	also	including	rotational	symmetry)	to	the	status	of	fundamental	principles	(see	again	Bueno	and	French	2018).		These	moves	involve	a	complex	but	unmysterious	intertwining	of	both	mathematical	and	physical	developments	and,	paraphrasing	Friedman,	we	might	perhaps	say	that	Weyl	and	Wigner	were	only	able	to	arrive	at	the	introduction	of	group	theory	in	quantum	mechanics	and	the	 elevation	of	 symmetry	within	modern	physics	by	 self-consciously	 situating	themselves	astride	both	sets	of	developments.	By	tracking	this	 intertwining	we	can	appreciate	how	Permutation	Symmetry,	for	example,	comes	to	be	elevated	to	the	status	of	a	constitutive	apriori	principle	as	identified	by	Caulton.			 Perhaps	it	was	because	the	development	of	General	Relativity	was	largely	the	 work	 of	 one	 man	 (the	 afore-mentioned	 parallel	 research	 of	 Hilbert	notwithstanding)	 that	 leads	 Friedman	 to	 try	 to	 solve	 the	 heuristic	 problem	 in																																																									8	 Given	 Friedman’s	 claim	 about	 Einstein	 above,	 it	 is	 interesting	 to	 note	 that	 in	 his	 later	application	of	group	theory	to	perception,	Cassirer	explicitly	situates	himself	between	Helmholtz	&	Poincaré		(1944).		9	 Indeed,	 the	 kinds	 of	 heuristic	 moves	 hinted	 at	 here,	 involving	 symmetry	 principles	 and	‘footprints’	were	originally	articulated	by	Post	as	part	of	a	general	critique	of	Kuhn’s	work.	
terms	of	Einstein	personally	 situating	himself	within	a	particular	philosophical	debate.	 But	 then	 the	 following	 concern	 arises	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 way	 that	Friedman	 frames	 the	 issue:	 given	 this	 shift	 in	 the	 status	 of	 the	 Principle	 of	Equivalence,	 from	 contingent	 fact	 to	 constitutive	 principle,	 ‘…	 it	 is	 hard	 to	 see	how	 the	way	 in	which	Einstein	 self-consciously	 situated	himself	 could	be	what	
made	 the	 principle	 of	 equivalence	 constitutively	 a	 priori	 in	 the	 new	 paradigm.	 ’	(Chignell	 2008,	 p.	 258).	 Such	 constitutive	 principles	 must	 be	 accepted	 if	 we	accept	the	theory	itself.	But	then	‘…	the	fact	that	a	particular	principle	is	one	of	these	 presuppositions	 and	 thus	 constitutive	 a	 priori	 relative	 to	 the	 theory	 in	
question	appears	to	be	a	hard	fact	of	transcendental	logic.’	(ibid.)	And	it	is	difficult	to	see	how	such	‘hard	facts’	can	be	made	to	obtain	…	simply	in	virtue	of	the	way	
that	someone	discovers	them.’	(ibid.).		 In	 the	 case	 of	 symmetries	 and	quantum	mechanics,	various	personalities	were	‘in	play’,	as	just	noted,	with	very	different	 philosophical	 backgrounds	 and	 agendas	 (if	 they	 had	 any	 at	 all).	 As	 a	solution	 to	 a	 historical	 problem,	 highlighting	 such	 personalities	 leaves	 in	 the	dark	 the	 forces	 that	 lie	 behind	 the	 various	 moves	 that	 are	 made.	 Instead,	 by	focusing	on	the	small	scale	moves	and	manouevres	that	were	undertaken	at	the	time	we	can	see	how	the	expansion	of	possibility	occurred,	one	step	at	a	time.10		 Curiously,	Friedman	himself	doesn’t	discuss	group	 theory	 in	 the	context	of	 quantum	 mechanics11,	 as	 Corfield	 notes,	 ‘…in	 his	 book,	 the	 only	 pieces	 of	mathematics	we	 hear	 about	 are	 Euclidean	 geometry,	 the	 calculus,	 Riemannian	geometry,	 Hilbert’s	 Foundations	 of	 Geometry,	 then	 the	 possibility	 of	 quantum	logic.	 ’	 (Corfield,	 preprint).	 Nevertheless,	 Friedman	 does	 argue	 that	 quantum	theory	falls	prey	to	the	Kuhnian	critique,	particularly	if	we	focus	on	the	contrast	with	 classical	 physics,	 as	 he	 insists	 that	 here	we	 lack	 the	means	 ‘to	 rationally	bridge	 the	 gap	 between	 prerevolutionary	 and	 post-revolutionary	 conceptual	landscapes“	 (Friedman	 2001,	 p.	 120).	 Again,	 however,	 this	 is	 too	 quick:	 recall	what	was	said	above	about	what	Cassirer	called	the	‘indwelling	sagacity’,	or	what	Saunders	referred	to	as	the	‘heuristic	plasticity’	of	certain	mathematical	devices,	such	 as	 Fourier	 analysis	 or	 the	 Poisson	 bracket,	which	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 playing	crucial	 roles	 in	 the	 early	 development	 of	 quantum	 theory.12	 Again,	 if	 we	 look	closely	at	the	moves	actually	made	at	the	time	we	can	see	how	to	bridge	the	gap	that	Friedman’s	framing	of	the	issue	appears	to	reveal.13			 Having	said	all	of	that,	still	the	core	issue	remains:	can	Cassirer,	with	his	rejection	of	pure	intuition,	accommodate	these	fundamental	shifts?	According	to	Friedman,	 	 ‘‘[b]y	 rejecting	 Kant’s	 original	 account	 of	 the	 transcendental	schematism	of	the	understanding	with	respect	to	a	distinct	faculty	of	sensibility	in	favour	of	a	teleologically	oriented	‘genetic’	conception	of	knowledge,	Cassirer	(and	 the	 Marburg	 School	 more	 generally)	 has	 thereby	 replaced	 Kant’s	constitutive	a	priori	with	a	purely	regulative	ideal’’	(Friedman	2000,	p.	117).	And	in	the	absence	of	the	former,	Friedman	claims,	we	cannot	capture	the	transition	
																																																								10	 Of	 course,	 for	 the	 realist,	 the	 Principle	 of	 Equivalence	 and	Permutation	 Symmetry	 are	 ‘hard	facts’	insofar	as	they	are	part	of	the	fundamental	structure	of	the	world.	11	But	then,	as	noted	previously,	Cassirer,	despite	invoking	group	theory	in	his	consideration	of	the	theory	of	perception,	doesn’t	mention	it	in	D&I.	12	For	a	more	recent	account	of	how	the	structuralist	can	accommodate	the	shift	from	classical	to	quantum	mechanics	see	Thebault	(2016).		13	In	effect	this	amounts	to	a	response	to	the	Kuhnian	basis	of	this	framing.	
from	 the	 theory	 of	 Newtonian	 gravity	 to	 General	 Relativity	 within	 a	 Kantian	framework.		 However,	this	 is	perhaps	to	give	Cassirer	short	shrift.	As	noted	here	and	highlighted	by	Ferrari	(2012),	Cassirer	maintained	a	functional	understanding	of	the	apriori	in	terms	of	which,	he	argued,	developments	in	modern	science	could	be	 accommodated.	 With	 regard	 to	 both	 General	 Relativity	 and	 quantum	mechanics,	he	attempted	 to	preserve	a	Kantian	 stance	 in	 light	of	 the	 impact	of	these	 theories	 on	 space-time	 and	 causality	 respectively.	 Thus	 the	 latter,	 as	indicated	 above,	 effectively	 gets	 folded	 into	 the	 general	 requirement	 of	lawfulness	and	the	full	impact	of	quantum	mechanics	is	reoriented	and	directed	at	the	notion	of	‘object’	rather	than	causation.	And	it	is	as	a	result	of	the	role	of	this	 lawfulness	that	we	can	claim	that	there	 is	objectivity	(rather	than	objects),	understood	 functionally.	 As	 Ferrari	 notes,	 in	 a	 letter	 to	 Schlick,	 Cassirer	emphasizes	his	view	of	the	apriori	‘…	not	as	a	steady	and	definitively	established	complex	 of	 material	 intuitions	 or	 concepts,	 but	 only	 as	 a	 function,	 which	 is	determined	according	 to	a	 law	and	 therefore	 it	 remains	 the	same	regarding	 its	direction	 and	 its	 form;	 nevertheless	 it	 can	 assume	 the	 most	 various	developments	in	the	progress	of	knowledge.	’	(Cassirer	2009,	p.	50).	As	a	general	principle,	 it	 can	 be	 understood	 simply	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 unity	 of	 nature,	 or	 the	lawfulness	 of	 experience	 in	 general,	 but	 how	 this	 comes	 to	 be	 concretely	specified	 in	particular	 terms	depends	on	the	progress	of	science.	And,	recalling	the	Reichenbachian	considerations	touched	on	earlier,	Ferrari	also	reminds	us	of	a	letter	from	Cassirer	to	Reichenbach	in	which	he	accuses	the	latter	of	presenting	Kant’s	 approach	 as	 in	 a	 ‘very	 excessive	 opposition’	 to	 his	 (Reichenbach’s)	 and	that	in	fact,	understood	in	the	way	that	Cassirer	proposes,	the	two	are	not	so	far	apart.		 Given	 this,	 let	 us	 now	 return	 to	 Friedman’s	 claim	 that	 Cassirer	 has	modeled	 his	 conception	 of	 the	 apriori	 on	 Kant’s	 conception	 of	 regulative	principles	and	thereby	sees	the	progress	of	science	as	consisting	of	a	converging	sequence	 with	 what	 is	 apriori	 taken	 to	 be	 that	 which	 remains	 invariant	throughout	 that	 process.	 	 Here	 one	 can	 question	 whether	 Cassirer’s	 universal	invariants	 of	 experience	 possess	 no	 constitutive	 role.	 As	 Ferrari	 notes,	 ‘Space,	time,	 causality	 and	 so	 on	 were	 the	 most	 general	 forms	 in	 which	 scientific	experience	 became	 available	 and	 could	 be	 structured,	 without	 assuming	 any	particular	 content	 as	 already	 embedded	 in	 such	 a	 priori	 invariants.	 ’	 (Ferrari	2012,	 p.	 24).	 Of	 course,	 Cassirer	 took	 the	 distinction	 between	 constitutive	 and	regulative	 principles	 to	 be	 weaker	 than	 in	 Kant’s	 view,	 precisely	 because	 he	viewed	 the	 development	 of	 scientific	 knowledge	 as	 a	 process	 involving	 the	elimination	 of	 substantival	 concepts	 and	 the	 elevation	 of	 a	 functional	 picture.	However,	‘…	this	signifies	by	no	means	that	Cassirer	transformed	the	constitutive	and	 historical	 changeable,	 relativized	 a	 priori	 into	 a	 ‘‘purely’’	 regulative	 one.’	(ibid.).	As	Ferrari	goes	on	to	state,	‘…Cassirer	emphasized	that	the	proper	task	of	the	 inquiry	 into	 the	 ‘‘conditions	 of	 possibility	 of	 experience’’	 (that	 is	 not	 only	scientific	experience,	but	any	kind	of	cultural	experience	as	well	as	of	symbolic	form)	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 individuation	 of	 constitutive	 principles	 making	 it	possible	that	experience	appears	as	a	structured	whole…’	(ibid.,	pp.	24-25).		 Thus	it	is	not	the	case	that	the	constitutive	has	been	entirely	replaced	by	the	 regulative.	 Indeed,	 granted	 that	 the	 distinction	 between	 constitutive	 and	regulative	 principles	 was	 weaker	 for	 Cassirer	 than	 in	 the	 Kantian	 case,	 he	
understood	 them	 as	 mutually	 cooperating	 in	 the	 grounding	 of	 scientific	experience.	Given	this,	there	is	still	space,	as	it	were,	within	Cassirer’s	framework	for	 a	 constitutive	 element	 to	 play	 a	 role	 and	 coupled	with	 the	 historical	 point	above	 regarding	 the	 steps	 actually	made	 in	moving	 from	Newtonian	 theory	 to	General	Relativity,	 or	 from	 classical	 to	 quantum	physics,	we	 can	 accommodate	the	 required	 expansion	 of	 the	 space	 of	 possibilities	 that	 Friedman	 illuminates.	Indeed,	if	we	regard	Permutation	Symmetry	as	a	constitutive	apriori	principle	in	the	way	 that	Caulton	suggests,	we	can	see	 the	excavation	of	 the	significance	of	this	principle	 for	quantum	mechanics	as	an	example	of	 just	such	an	expansion.	And	what	motivated	 it	was	precisely	 the	undermining	by	quantum	statistics	of	the	 notion	 of	 ‘object’	 that	 Cassirer	 claimed	 meshed	 so	 beautifully	 with	 Kant’s	philosophy,	as	he	spelled	out	in	detail	in	Determinism	and	Indeterminism.			
Conclusion	As	Ferrari	suggests	 in	 the	conclusion	of	his	own	paper	(op.	cit.,	p.	25),	Cassirer	can	 be	 regarded	 as	 a	 ‘very	 modern’	 philosopher,	 not	 least	 in	 his	 approach	 to	science.	And	as	I	have	tried	to	indicate	here,	he	can	be	regarded	as	a	philosopher	of	modern	science,	in	the	form	of	quantum	theory	and	the	Standard	Model.	There	seems	to	be	no	insurmountable	obstacle	to	extending	the	framework	laid	down	in	 Determinism	 and	 Indeterminism	 to	 the	 physics	 of	 the	 latter;	 nor,	 I	 would	maintain,	 should	 there	 be	 any	 objection	 to	 appropriating	 aspects	 of	 this	framework	 for	 realist	 purposes.	 Of	 course,	whether	 the	 neo-Kantian	 stance	 or	some	 form	 of	 structural	 realism	 is	 to	 be	 preferred	 in	 this	 context	 is	 another	question	entirely	and	one	that	I	shall	leave	for	another	opportunity!		
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